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INTRODUCTION 
 
From its earliest days as a British outpost, Singapore has relied heavily for its economic 
survival on its position as an entrepot trading centre. In the first decades after independence in 
1965, economic strategy was focused on building infrastructure, attracting foreign direct 
investment, and export-led growth. The political commitment to openness in both trade and 
capital — and, more recently, labour — is one of the key features of a strategy that has delivered 
remarkable returns in terms of the economic well-being of the people of Singapore. Between 
1961 and 1996 GDP per capita grew at an average rate of 10.4 percent a year (Ho and Hoon, 
2000), vaulting the country into the ranks of the developed economies. However, until recently, 
the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, insofar as they featured in this strategy, has 
been secondary. They were primarily the local links of the supply chains of the multinational 
corporations which had set up operations in the country. Nonetheless, in this capacity, they 
benefited from having largely assured demand for their products, and were often also recipients 
of technology transfer. 
 
In the late 1980s and 1990s the strategy underwent a significant shift. Following the country’s 
first post-independence recession in 1985, the role of SMEs came to the forefront in the 
blueprint that was mapped out by the governmental body charged with the task of formulating 
a strategy for the future. In the wake of the 1997-98 “Asian crisis”, a new element was added 
to this strategy: to gear the skills base and infrastructure of the economy into the “knowledge-
based economy”, also known as the New Economy. The knowledge-based economy is 
perceived as bringing with it a fundamental change driven by two main forces: globalisation 
and technology. The advent of the knowledge-based economy is rightly viewed as a global 
development that any nation, particularly one as small and open as Singapore, could ignore 
only at substantial peril to its competitive position. The government’s vision has been widely 
disseminated by means of various policy documents outlining the vision, as well as wide 
exposure and discussion in the mass media. Consistent with this, technology-based 
entrepreneurs1 have been identified as the enterprises the government is intent on nurturing for 
the 21st century.  
 
With this drive, the role of entrepreneurs and SMEs in Singapore in the official view has 
undergone a sea change. During the colonial period after the founding of Singapore in 1819 
and into the early decades of independence, local entrepreneurs had tended to be regarded with 
benign neglect. The  post-1985 period has seen official recognition of the key role SMEs can 
play in innovation and in moving the economy up the value chain to higher “value added” 
activities. The initiatives in this respect may be seen as very much part of a comprehensive 
                                                 
1 The somewhat unwieldy term “technopreneurship” has been coined to refer to this form of entrepreneurship. 
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program to bring about the transformation of the Singapore economy to a knowledge-based 
economy. The results have been remarkable. The Singapore economy in the 1990s has 
consistently been ranked by the Swiss-based International Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Report as among the three most competitive in the 
world, together with the United States and Hong Kong. The broad strategy which has delivered 
this outcome relies on a continued concerted effort to upgrade the country’s human resource 
base and physical infrastructure, and continual fine-tuning of economic incentives while 
moving up the value chain to stay ahead of its regional neighbours. The country has become 
by one recent assessment the most globalised nation in the world (Foreign Policy, 2000), 
reflecting, inter alia, its continuing openness to trade, foreign direct investments and portfolio 
capital flows, but also the increasing utilisation of information technologies. As a recent report 
by the International Monetary Fund noted: 
 
Continued success in shifting to a knowledge-based economy will rely increasingly on the 
development of a more dynamic and entrepreneurial private sector, through deregulation, 
privatisation, and upgrading human capital. (IMF, 2000) 
 
In this chapter, we outline the role of SMEs in relation to Singapore’s economic development, 
the experience of the SMEs during the Asian financial crisis, and their prospects in the 
knowledge economy. We begin by examining the definitions of SMEs used for policy purposes 
and the contribution of SMEs to the overall economy of Singapore before moving on to look 
at the role of entrepreneurs and SMEs in Singapore in historical context. An important key to 
understanding developments in the post-colonial period is the extent to which government is 
involved in providing initiative and direction, not only to economic activity, but to almost every 
aspect of social policy, in Singapore. This occurs to a much greater extent than tends to be the 
case in other market economies. Official attention has turned in recent years to the need to 
develop a more entrepreneurial culture as a prerequisite if the country is to reap the benefits 
offered by the New Economy. SMEs are the logical entities to meet this challenge. The extent 
to which they are able to do so will shape the future of the country. 
 
 
SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN SINGAPORE 
 
Definitions 
For policy purposes, local SMEs are defined by the Productivity and Standards Board (PSB) 
as enterprises with at least 30% local equity; fixed asset investment of up to S$15 million in 
the case of SMEs in manufacturing; and up to 50 employees in the case of service sector SMEs. 
The definition is occasionally revised (see Table 1). 
 
 
TABLE 1: Definitions of Local SMEs in Singapore, 1994 and 2000 
Business Sector Local Equity Fixed Assets at Net 
Book Value 
No. of Employees 
 1994 2000 1994 2000 1994 2000 
Service & 
Commerce 
 
 
>30% 
 
>30% 
 
S$12 m. 
 
S$15 m. 
 
<100 
 
<50 
Manufacturing >30% >30% S$12 m. S$15 m. N.A. N.A. 
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The contribution of SMEs to the Singapore economy is shown in Table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Contribution of the SME Sector to the Singapore Economy (1997) 
 
Sector 
Establishments Employment Value Added 
(VA) 
VA/Estb VA / Worker 
Number Percent Number Percent (S$b) Percent (S$'000) (S$'000) Percent 
Overall Economy         
SMEs 98,156 92.1 801,635 72.2 52,580 58.1 536 66 80.5 
Others 8,365 7.9 309,294 27.8 37,905 41.9 4,531 123 150.5 
Total 106,521 100.0 1,110,929 100.0 90,485 100.0 849 81 100.0 
Manufacturing         
SMEs 3,772 91.8 175,851 48.0 7,442 25.1 1,973 42 52.3 
Others 336 8.2 190,845 52.0 22,212 74.9 66,107 116 143.9 
Total 4,108 100.0 366,696 100.0 29,654 100.0 7,219 81 100.0 
Commerce 
SMEs 52,713 96.0 272,133 77.7 15,602 71.1 296 57 91.5 
Others 2,222 4.0 78,202 22.3 6,352 28.9 2,859 81 129.6 
Total 54,935 100.0 350,335 100.0 21,954 100.0 400 63 100.0 
Service          
SMEs 41,671 87.8 353,651 89.8 29,536 76.0 709 84 84.6 
Others 5,807 12.2 40,247 10.2 9,341 24.0 1,609 232 235.2 
Total 47,478 100.0 393,898 100.0 38,877 100.0 819 99 100.0 
Source: Productivity and Standards Board, 2000 
 
It is clear that SMEs play an integral role in the economy. In 1997, they employed 72 percent 
of all workers in the country and contributed 58 percent of the value added. They augment the 
economic activities of the larger manufacturing concerns, the multinational enterprises and the 
larger listed companies. They provide services in the areas of logistics, services, and trading.  
 
On the other hand, if they are inefficient, SMEs utilise capacity that could be better utilised in 
other activities. Hence, a major concern of Government agencies has been over the productivity 
of the SMEs. In 1997, the value-added per worker in SMEs in general was roughly half that of 
workers in other establishments (S$66,000 compared with S$123,000). The disparity is 
particularly marked in Manufacturing and in Services, where SME value-added per worker in 
both these sectors was just 36 percent that of workers in other establishments. It is less 
pronounced in Commerce, at 70 percent.  
 
 
TRANSITIONS IN THE ROLE OF ENTREPRENEURS AND SMES IN SINGAPORE 
 
Beginnings to 1985 
Founded in 1819, Singapore grew quickly as a British trading port along with Penang and 
Malacca. The indigenous Malay population was augmented significantly by early immigrants 
who came from mainland China, India and the Middle-east, with the majority being Chinese.  
The immigrants tended to see themselves as transient visitors to the island, for whom a chief 
objective was to remit their earnings home.  They had a short time horizon on their activities.  
While they came largely as labourers, inevitably some became entrepreneurs. These early 
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immigrant entrepreneurs were opportunistic entrepreneurs, or “arbitrageurs”, in Kirzner’s  
terminology, who recognised and exploited the opportunities presented to them in the new 
British colony.  It would be a mistake, however, to regard them with disdain. Yu (1996), in his 
examination of Hong Kong’s economic development, concluded that opportunistic 
entrepreneurship contributed more significantly to its economic growth than Schumpeterian 
type entrepreneurs, who bring about new combinations and inventions.2 The early Singapore 
economy had many things in common with the situation in early Hong Kong, including the 
nature of entrepreneurial activities.  
 
The social backgrounds of the immigrants strongly influenced the nature of their activities 
when they arrived in Singapore. A large proportion of the Chinese immigrants to Singapore 
had fled poverty and unemployment in the coastal regions in China. They came with little 
capital and few business skills and network alliances — not, on the face of it, very promising 
material or under exactly the best conditions for business startups.3 The Indian immigrants 
came as British convict labourers and as workers for farms, plantations, and construction 
workers.  In Singapore’s economic development they have been conspicuous as textile and 
piece-goods wholesalers and retailers, money-lenders, civil servants and labourers (Sandhu, 
1993).  They also had almost a monopoly of the laundry business in early Singapore (Mani, 
1993).  
 
A prominent feature of the early entrepreneurs in Singapore was the tendency to establish 
businesses that were family owned and controlled. These family businesses thrived, a number 
of them growing into dynamic large businesses well into their second and third generations of 
successors (Fock, 1995).  Some of these family businesses are represented today in the 
hospitality industry as hoteliers, in the finance industry as bankers and owners of finance 
companies, in the real estate and construction industry as property developers and in the 
pharmaceutical industry as manufacturers of Chinese medical products. 
 
After independence in 1965, the Singapore economy experienced two decades of continuous 
high growth. This growth took place seemingly despite the state of the business cycle and other 
developments in the rest of the world — global recessions and oil crises — with 5% GDP 
growth in a “bad” year and 15% in a boom year (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1986). A key 
aspect of the government’s economic strategy centred on attracting foreign direct investments 
through a range of incentives, including preferential tax and accounting treatment, and the 
continuous upgrading of physical infrastructure. The policy was highly successful. Together 
with the economic incentives, and offering an excellent infrastructure for industry and a well-
educated and disciplined English-speaking labour force, the country was an attractive location 
for multinationals seeking a low-cost base in Asia. In large part, therefore, the multinationals 
provided the engine for growth during this period, setting the stage for continued growth by 
the transfer of technology and other expertise. The role of SMEs in generating the remarkable 
growth of this period was relatively minor by comparison.  
 
1985 to Present 
The boom period was interrupted when recession struck in 1985. During the intense official 
(and non-official) soul-searching that ensued, the importance of entrepreneurs in the economy 
was realised and re-discovered, as Kent (1984) observed had been the case in many rapidly 
                                                 
2  See also Cheah and Yu (1996). 
3 This contrasted with the situation in Hong Kong after the 1949 Communist takeover of the mainland. The British 
colony received entrepreneurs fleeing the Communists from Shanghai and elsewhere on the mainland. These 
people possessed business experience, expertise, capital and technical skills (Sit, Cremer, and Wong, 1991). 
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developing economies. The Economic Committee that was appointed in the same year by the 
government to review the progress of the economy and to identify new directions for its future 
growth recommended that attention be paid to entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized 
local businesses.  
 
Prior to this, there had been little direct emphasis on smaller local enterprises (Doh, 1996).  It 
was now felt that the smaller, more nimble local enterprises could provide a buffer to the more 
ponderous multinational corporations. The Economic Committee recommended that the 
government should take steps to remove impediments and actively encourage the growth of 
local small and medium enterprises (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1986). This report led to 
the first SME Master Plan (Economic Development Board, 1989). The strategy enunciated was 
to stimulate local enterprises through the creation of a more pro-enterprise environment, 
providing assistance for self-help, and accelerating the pace of growth with a range of 
incentives. The government’s role was to guide and assist enterprises by setting the direction, 
improving the business environment and building up a supportive infrastructure (Economic 
Development Board, 1989).  
 
It is interesting to reflect on the changes to the role accorded by policymakers to entrepreneurial 
activity in Singapore and on their implications. Until the publication of the SME Master Plan, 
there had been an emphasis on MNCs and the development of state enterprises in the areas of 
manufacturing, shipping, air transport, international trade, long-term finance, marine-related 
services, technology and defence-related industries. These state enterprises, it has been argued, 
may be considered to constitute a distinct category of entrepreneurship, what Lee and Low 
(1990) have termed “state entrepreneurship.” Thus the implicit belief in the primacy of 
government in identifying and articulating a strategic vision for the economy extended to 
undertaking entrepreneurial activities, except that the traditional channels of these activities, 
SMEs, were not recognised. The recent change in policy would appear to reflect the 
government’s recognition of the central role of SMEs as a source of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Government policy is now focused on encouraging and nurturing successful 
indigenous companies with the potential to grow into companies of global stature. Yet just as 
there may be a touch of irony in the notion of state entrepreneurship, there may also be irony 
in government identifying and setting the direction (technological innovation) for 
entrepreneurs to take. Given the government’s record of success, however, it would be unwise 
to scoff at this approach. 
 
Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis  
The economy of Singapore is extraordinarily open and dependent on trade (see Tables 3). 
Given this, it would be surprising if it had escaped the Asian financial crisis unaffected. What 
is remarkable is that it was not more seriously affected than it was, and the speed with which 
the economy recovered. The impact of the crisis was less pronounced than in the other countries 
of the region. The economy slid into a recession in early 1998 but GDP growth in 1998 overall 
was 0.4 percent, rebounding to 5.5 percent in 1999. During that time the unemployment rate 
reached a peak of 4.5 percent in 1998, dropping to 3 percent at end-1999 and to 2.9 percent in 
early 2000.  
 
 
Table 3: Openness of the Singapore Economy 
 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
Exports/GDP 1.42 1.01 0.79 1.12 1.56 1.27 1.35 1.33 
Imports/GDP 1.70 1.22 1.27 1.54 2.05 1.44 1.52 1.40 
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Total Trade/GDP 3.12 2.23 2.06 2.66 3.61 2.71 2.87 2.73 
Source: Adapted from Ho and Hoon (2000) 
 
Table 4 shows the impact of the Asian crisis on the country’s external trade. Total trade fell by 
7.5 percent in 1998, then recovered by 8.1 percent in 1999 to the pre-crisis level of $382 billion 
that was achieved in 1997 (Trade Development Board, 1999). The growth reflected a strong 
17.3 percent increase in the second half of 1999, following a marginal decline of 0.9 percent in 
the first half of 1999. The significant improvement in the second half of 1999 was supported 
by the continued recovery of crisis-hit Asian economies, as well as the increasing global 
demand for certain product segments, in particular, electronics.  
 
Table 4: Trade Performance (% and S$b) 
 1997 
Annual 
Change 
(%) 
1997 
Annual 
(S$b) 
1998 
Annual 
Change 
(%) 
1998 
Annual 
(S$b) 
1999 
Annual 
Change 
(%) 
1999 
Annual 
(S$b) 
Non-Oil Domestic Imports  5.3 91.6 0.9 92.4 9.5 101.2 
Non-Oil Re-Exports 7.3 77.8 -0.1 77.7 0.1 77.8 
Non-Oil Imports 6.0 178.0 -12.2 156.2 9.5 171.1 
Oil Exports  -3.0 16.2 -15.9 13.6 12.4 15.3 
Non-Oil Trade 6.1 347.4 -6.1 326.3 7.3 350.0 
Total Trade  5.7 382.2 -7.5 353.6 8.1 382.4 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry (2000) 
 
The extent of the recovery is shown in the outlook for Singapore’s trade in 2000, which is 
expected to grow by between 11 and 13 percent (Trade Development Board, 2000). The 
outlook for Singapore trade vis-à-vis other countries is shown in Table 5 below.  
 
 
Table 5: Singapore’s Outlook for Trade in 2000 vis-à-vis Other Countries 
 1998 OECD1 IMF2 Singapore 
Government 
1st half 
99 
2nd 
half 99 
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 
World 2.5 n.a n.a. 3.0 3.5 3.0 3.5 n.a. n.a. 
US 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.1 3.7 2.6 3.2 n.a. 
EU 2.8 1.6 3.1 2.1 2.8 2.0 2.7 2.1 3.0 
UK 2.1 1.1 3.1 1.7 2.7 1.1 2.4 1.5 2.75 
Germany 2.8 0.7 3.3 1.3 2.3 1.4 2.5 1.4 2.7 
Japan -2.8 3.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.5 0.63 1.03 
Indonesia -13.7 n.a. -0.5 2.5 -0.8 2.6 0.0 3 to 4 
Thailand -8.0 n.a. 3.8 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.4 
Malaysia -6.8 n.a. 4.5 5.5 2.4 6.5 4.3 5.3 
Philippines -0.5 n.a. 3.2 4.5 2.2 3.5 2.6 - 3.2 4.0 
Taiwan 4.9 n.a. n.a n.a. 5.0 5.1 5.48 6.04 
Hong Kong -5.1 n.a. 0.0 4.0 1.2 3.6 1.8 4.5 
Korea -5.5 n.a. 9.0 6.5 6.5 5.5 8.8 6.4 
China 7.8 n.a. 7.1 6.8 6.6 6.0 7.0 7.0 
Singapore4  -7.5 -0.9 17.3     8.1 11-13 
 
1 OECD Economic Outlook   
2 IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
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3 Refers to fiscal year, i.e. April current year to April subsequent year.  
4 Trade Development Board, Review of 1999 Trade Performance and Outlook for Year 2000. 
 
 
The relatively mild impact of the Asian crisis on Singapore can be attributed to two main 
factors: strong fundamentals and a flexible and timely policy response (Stone, 1999; IMF, 
2000). The strong fundamentals include responsible and credible fiscal and monetary policy, 
flexible labour markets and policies, and an open trade regime. The effects of the recession 
were mitigated by the government’s actions to improve enterprise cost competitiveness. A top 
priority in the crisis was to minimise unemployment and to preserve the production capacity. 
On a policy level, business cost reductions were engineered through wage cuts and various fees 
and tax rebates, amounting to US$7.4 billion, or about 7 percent of GDP. The wage cut was 
achieved through a reduction in mandatory employers’ contributions to workers’ Central 
Provident Fund4 contributions from 20 percent to 10 percent of wages.5 A fiscal stimulatory 
package comprising sharply increased development expenditures which brought the budget 
balance into a deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP in 1998/99, the first deficit since the recession in 
1985, was to have been sustained into 1999/2000. The deficit was expected to widen to 3.5 
percent of GDP (Stone, 1999). However, this subsequent fiscal stimulus was withdrawn in view 
of the strength of the recovery, and a strictly neutral fiscal stance adopted instead.  
 
The immediate impact of the Asian financial crisis on SMEs was on their exports. The export 
markets of most Singapore SMEs are regional markets in Asia. The financial contagion that 
affected the region negatively affected sales. The greatest difficulty faced by these SMEs, if 
not all local enterprises, was securing access to financing to tide over the recession that affected 
their domestic and international sales.  
 
The findings of a study by Tan and Tan (1998) provide an insight into the manner in which the 
SMEs coped with the financial crisis as well as into the impact of the crisis on SMEs. The study 
was a longitudinal one involving two samples of SMEs – one sample of 132 SMEs in 1996 (a 
“good year”), and the second sample of 82 SMEs in 1998 (a “bad year”). They defined SMEs 
as enterprises with less than 200 employees. The study was conducted in the first quarters of 
1996 and 1998. In 1996, the year before the onset of the crisis, the country enjoyed GDP growth 
of 9.5 percent. The 1998 survey was taken six months into the crisis, when its effects had started 
to bite. The SMEs were asked to rate the importance of sixteen generic strategies to improving 
their profitability on a 5-point scale with 1 being “extremely undesirable” and 5 being 
“extremely desirable” in priority.  
 
The authors found differences in the importance placed by the SMEs on different strategies in 
the two periods. The differences in the means for each of the strategies in both years were 
analysed using analysis of variance. The results of the analysis are summarised in Table 6 
below. 
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of Strategies for Improving Profitability in 1996 and 1998 
                                                 
4 The Central Provident Fund scheme is essentially a state-administered superannuation scheme covering all 
workers in the country. It has proved a powerful tool of economic policy for the government, allowing it to fine-
tune wages, and delivering a degree of flexibility not available to most other governments. 
5 The cuts were partially restored; as of April 2000, employer contributions to their employees’ CPF were 
increased by 2 percent to 12 percent.  
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Strategy 1996 1998 F statistic p 
Redeployment of Staff 3.1468 3.5000 3616.79+ 0.00+ 
Greater Financial Control 3.9541 4.1866 7406.99*** 0.01*** 
Better Working Capital Management  3.9083 4.1493 6060.06** 0.02** 
Staff Reductions 2.6514 2.8731 2343.06** 0.05** 
Increasing Advertising Expenditure 2.9358 2.7239 2462.11* 0.06* 
Reduced Borrowing 3.2064 3.4179 2642.69* 0.10* 
Becoming More Environment-Friendly 
 
3.4128 3.2239 3456.55* 0.10* 
Increased Turnover in Reduced prices 2.9817 3.1940 2003.66 0.12 
Divesting non-core Business 3.0092 2.8433 20399.95 0.20 
Curtailing Training Expenditure 2.2018 2.3284 1770.57 0.24 
Contracting in/out 3.0321 3.1418 2733.15 0.35 
Curtailing Management Development  2.2156 2.2985 1578.64 0.47 
Improved Management of Quality 4.2615 4.2388 6893.35 0.82 
Increased Product Focus 4.0321 4.0075 4269.03 0.84 
Targeted Marketing 4.0780 4.0672 5235.45 0.92 
Curtailing R&D expenditure 2.2890 2.2985 1355.82 0.94 
*p=0.10  **p=0.05 ***p=0.01 +p=0.00 
Source: Tan and Tan (1998) 
 
Significant differences were found between the mean scores of several strategies between the 
two surveys. The findings indicated that the SMEs placed greater emphasis on financial control 
and better working capital management in 1998, after the onset of the crisis. Cost reduction 
strategies were also foremost in their minds as indicated by the change in the mean for reduced 
borrowing and for staff reductions. The results also indicated a significant decrease in the 
importance attached to advertising and to becoming more environment-friendly. In general, the 
SMEs’ focus on cost-reduction strategies reinforced the government’s policies. While staff 
reductions were regarded as more important in 1998, the desirability of redeploying staff was 
rated as significantly more important for profitability, perhaps indicating that the SMEs were 
mindful of not decimating the core competencies represented in their human resources.  
 
The fact that significant differences were found in the means for greater financial control, 
reduced borrowing and better working capital management would appear to indicate 
difficulties with liquidity, and that one of the impacts of the crisis on SMEs was reduced access 
to financing. An interesting aspect of the findings, as Tan and Tan (1998) noted, was that the 
SMEs appear to have differentiated between short-term contingency actions and longer-term 
strategic imperatives. Thus, for example, there were no significant differences in the means for 
curtailing R&D expenditure, reduction of training expenditure and curtailing management 
development, reduction strategies which would affect a firm’s long term development plans 
and human resource strategies.6  
 
Fortunately, for the Singapore SMEs, the economy recovered, rebounding in 1999, enabling 
the government to focus on the transition to the knowledge-based economy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This view is weakly reinforced by the fact that the study also found a non-significant increase in the importance 
attributed to improving the management of quality. 
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TRANSITION TO THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 
 
Infrastructure and Use of Technology 
In general, the infrastructure in Singapore to cater to the requirements of the knowledge-based 
economy is comprehensive and as developed as it is anywhere else in the world. The 
foundations of the information highway were laid in the 1980s, and the physical infrastructure 
is of an excellent standard. The country is among the front runners of Asian countries in terms 
of the widespread availability and use of technology (see Table 7). Singapore ONE (“One 
Network for Everyone”), a national broadband high-speed network established in 1997, 
delivers interactive multimedia applications and services to almost every home, school and 
office in the country (Tan, 1999). Since then other broadband offerings by other providers have 
established a presence on the market, e.g. cable modem access provided by Singapore Cable 
Vision. 
 
TABLE 7: Use of Technology, Selected Countries 
 Singapore Australia Hong 
Kong 
Japan Korea New 
Zealand 
Personal Computers per 
’000 pop 
399.5 362.2 230.8 202.4 150.7 263.9 
Telephone main lines per 
’000 pop 
543 505 565 479 444 486 
Mobile phones per ’000 
pop 
273 264 343 304 150 149 
Source: World Bank (2000) 
 
 
The population is well-educated and technically literate. Access to the Internet is relatively 
widespread, with 42 percent of households linked to the Internet, compared with 22 percent in 
Australia and 13 percent in Japan.7  
 
In terms of the legal framework, the Electronic Transactions Act, which provides a legal 
foundation for electronic transactions and is based on the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Electronic Commerce, was enacted in 
1998. It is backed up by the Computer Misuse Act, which was amended to provide greater 
protection to critical computer systems. In addition, copyright laws were updated to protect 
multimedia works, and a Privacy Code to safeguard consumer data was drafted for industry 
self-regulation (National Computer Board, 1998). In 1999, the Electronic Transactions 
(Certification Authority) Regulations 1999 came into effect. The resulting legal infrastructure 
is designed to provide greater certainty to individuals and businesses conducting electronic 
commerce, and to encourage the growth of electronic commerce.   
 
The government has declared its intention to increase the use of some form of e-commerce by 
SMEs to 25 percent by 2003.8 However, while access to the Internet is widespread, the number 
of businesses utilising electronic commerce is low. A survey of businesses in the country, 
broken down by establishment size as measured by number of employees, indicated that while 
more than 80 percent of businesses had access to the World Wide Web, less than 31 percent 
                                                 
7 Figures reported in the Sydney Morning Herald (“Web of Intrigue”), 29 April 2000.  
8 Raj (2000), reporting on an address by the Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology, 
Lim Swee Say. 
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had a business home page (see Table 8). The groups with the highest proportion of business e-
commerce users were the larger businesses. 
 
TABLE 8: Access to the World Wide Web by Business Size, 1998 
Business Size (no. of employees) % with access 
to the web 
% with home 
page 
<25  80.0 28.8 
25-99  86.5 46.3 
100-199  99.7 63.7 
200-499 97.7 77.6 
>500 100.0 85.6 
All businesses 80.8 30.8 
Source: National Computer Board (1999a) 
 
Another survey of Internet-based business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce in 
Singapore, conducted in January 1999, revealed that while more than 16 percent of large 
companies were using the Internet for B2B electronic commerce, less than 8 percent of small 
and medium companies were doing so (National Computer Board, 1999b).9  
 
Policy Measures 
In January 2000 the government issued its second major policy document on SMEs, SME 21: 
Preparing SMEs for the 21st Century. This report, a 10-year plan for the development of the 
SME sector, expands on the 1989 SME Master Plan and focuses on the outlook for SMEs in 
the twenty-first century. Developed collectively with representatives from SMEs, industry and 
trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry, financial institutions and government 
agencies, the plan recommends key strategies and programmes to realise the vision of creating 
vibrant and resilient SMEs in order to enhance the economy’s competitiveness and economic 
growth.  
 
A comprehensive network of government agencies charged with various aspects of SME policy 
and assistance programs has been put together since the focus on SMEs was first articulated. 
The lead agency for administering SME policy is the Singapore Productivity and Standards 
Board (PSB). There are some eighty assistance programs that address the needs of SMEs. It is 
instructive to examine these because they reflect the key areas of perceived need of SMEs. The 
discussion here adopts the framework of the APEC SME Ministerial Meeting in Osaka in 1994, 
which identified the four key problem areas of SMEs as being access to technology, access to 
manpower, access to finance, and access to markets. 
 
Access to Technology 
The relative lack of size of SMEs often tends to be a disadvantage when it comes to access to 
technology. This is an important factor given the critical reliance of a knowledge-driven 
strategy on access to technology. The key issues relate to the areas of awareness of the need 
for new technologies, identification, evaluation of the technical and commercial feasibility of 
new technology and prototyping. Closely related to these considerations is the issue of 
encouraging and accelerating the diffusion of technology to SMEs generally.  
 
                                                 
9 For the purpose of the survey, small companies were defined as those with less than 10 employees, medium 
companies as those with between 10 and 99 employees, and large companies as those with 100 or more employees.  
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SME 21 (Productivity and Standards Board, 2000) has attempted to address this with two 
proposals. SME 21 has proposed a Technology Network (TechNet) Programme to facilitate 
connections to researchers, experts and venture capital funds. Researchers with potential 
research ideas can register their interest with the programme and be matched with prospective 
SMEs or investors. Incentives can be provided to encourage such collaborations. 
 
The technology matching programme could be carried out through a physical centre or the 
Internet. Facilitators can also help prepare the business proposals and seek funding from 
venture capitalists and business angels. A mechanism can be set up to gather the latest 
technology trends and market intelligence through the government-linked offices. The TechNet 
Programme will: 
 
  Organise overseas technology missions to study new technologies. 
  Foster partnerships with foreign research organisations and patent holders and assist in the 
application of patents and trademarks. 
 Conduct research into technology trends and forecasting. 
  Develop a database on best practices in technology management, technology trends and 
market intelligence. 
  Develop a listing of venture capitalists and business angels. 
 
The second proposal under SME21 is business fusion. The term is used in the document to 
refer to a process whereby a group of related companies come together to share knowledge, 
experience and ideas. It can provide a platform to spur the development of new and innovative 
products, services and business formats. The government’s intention is to provide access to 
internally developed technology through business fusion, drawing upon the Japanese 
experience. In Japan, the Small Business Fusion Foundation actively encourages business 
fusion activities and promotes new ideas, products and services developed from such 
interactions.  
 
The PSB is charged with spearheading the development of business fusion groups together 
with the SMEs, trade chambers and industry associations. SMEs under the Business Fusion 
Programme can be supported by technical specialists, facilitators and R&D centres which will 
test the viability of the participants’ ideas and innovations, and be funded by the Local 
Enterprise Technical Assistance Scheme (LETAS). 
 
LETAS is intended to help local enterprises defray the costs incurred in modernising and 
upgrading their operations through the engagement of an external expert for a limited period 
of time. The scheme generally grants support of up to 70% of the cost of engaging external 
experts for an approved short-term assignment. The areas of assistance that may be supported 
include the identification and solving of technical problems, technical improvements to present 
operations or processes, mechanisation, automation or computerisation of operations or 
processes, quality management systems, business development, financial development, market 
development, management information, human resource management, product development, 
and franchise feasibility study and development. 
 
 
Access to Manpower  
At non-managerial level, SMEs have tended to have difficulties in recruiting staff. The fact that 
the economy was in a state of full employment prior to the Asian financial crisis meant that 
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recruiting employees at non-managerial level was particularly acute. The Asian crisis led to an 
easing of the labour shortage but this was merely a temporary reprieve.  
 
The problem is worse with regard to graduate-level and professional staff. The widely-held 
perception that SMEs are not good paymasters, and that they are less dynamic in terms of 
rewards and professional development, has meant that SMEs have tended to experience 
difficulty attracting young graduates and managerial staff. Some of the motivations of 
professionals are highlighted in a recent study of professional managers in Singapore family 
businesses (Tan and Zutshi, 2000). Tan and Zutshi (2000) found that whilst the professionals 
surveyed did choose to work in SMEs, all of them did so with the hope of a reward in being 
responsible to taking the firm to a public listing. It was even highlighted as a means to impress 
their contemporaries who may be serving in larger corporations: to be a success in the corporate 
world. It also offered some the opportunity to serve as general managers or CEOs in 
corporations when they otherwise may not have had the chance in a large multinational.  
 
Since 1997 government policy has attempted to assist local enterprises in professionalising 
their management by providing scholarships tenable at the Economic Development Board 
(EDB), but served at a “promising local enterprise” under the EDB-PLE scholarship scheme.  
The scheme serves to attract scholars to work for the local enterprises under the auspices of the 
EDB.  The scholars would be able to pursue a career with the EDB after their stint with the 
local enterprises should they not be satisfied with the opportunities there. 
 
Under SME 21, the PSB will work with the chambers of commerce, industry associations and 
innovative high-growth firms, such as promising SMEs, to design more of such scholarships 
or human resource development programmes for local talent, on a cost-sharing basis. The 
promising SMEs can provide tertiary scholarships and internships or industrial attachment 
programmes to undergraduates. Training institutes and polytechnics can also offer 
apprenticeship programmes to workers in SMEs. 
 
SMEs are in the same position as other employers in that they have access to incentives under 
the Skills Development Fund. This Fund not only serves to motivate the employers to engage 
in training of their staff but also the training providers as well. They are motivated to have their 
training programmes accredited so that the employers will be entitled to reimbursement for part 
of their employees’ training costs. A training provider, initiating a new training programme, 
will not be able to advertise that its participants who are employees qualify for funding from 
the Skills Development Fund, unless it has successfully conducted the programme on two prior 
occasions. It needs to submit its programme outline and the participant evaluations of the 
programmes to the Skills Development Fund for its consideration. Upon obtaining its 
accreditation, the provider may include in its announcements the availability of Skills 
Development Fund funding, which is up to fifty per cent of the training costs. To be eligible, 
the employing companies have to be registered in Singapore, with training being fully 
sponsored by the companies. Workers also have to be Singapore citizens or permanent 
residents, or those with three-year work permits (Productivity and Standards Board, 1999). 
 
Access to manpower does not merely refer only to the availability of manpower but the 
availability of skilled manpower. Structured on-the-job training (OJT) is a cost-effective means 
of training encouraged by the Singapore government. It helps to develop the job-specific skills 
of employees as business requirements change.  PSB has developed OJT blueprints for specific 
jobs in different industries.  There is obvious potential for these to be adapted for use by SMEs.  
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Structured OJT can benefit the organisations and their workforce in a number of ways. 
Organisations that have a structured OJT system will be able to train staff more quickly and 
respond swiftly to constantly changing technology and new demands. They will be able to 
reduce their time-to-market. As organisational and task analyses are involved in the 
development of structured OJT, there will be better workflow and improved work processes as 
well as more effective staff deployment. As OJT is one-to-one training, it allows for individual 
difference in learning and helps strengthen the bond between staff and supervisor resulting in 
better staff performance. OJT can reduce training costs by as much as 75 percent as employees 
need not be released from their jobs for training, which part of work. OJT at the same time 
partially addresses the needs of SMEs affected by the turnover of staff. A high turnover of staff 
may render it difficult to have new staff trained when they are required to cover the 
responsibilities vacated by their predecessors.  
 
To provide access to manpower, the Ministry of Manpower has a service for employers and 
employees.  Employees can submit their details to the MOM.  This is particularly relevant to 
retrenched workers.  The employers may use the service to recruit suitable manpower without 
advertising or relying on human resource specialists. 
 
Access to Finance 
As in other countries, this is a particular area of difficulty for SMEs in Singapore. The venture 
capital market is relatively undeveloped, although efforts have been made by the government 
to encourage such a market.   
 
Two related initiatives are planned under SME 21, business angel networks and working capital 
matching. Business angels can be a catalyst in starting a business.  These informal investors 
are wealthy individuals who are prepared to use their financial resources to make risky 
investments based on their business acumen, experience and interests.  They are often retired 
senior executives of big enterprises, or people who have sold their companies and now intend 
to reinvest their money. Besides providing financial support, business angels can provide 
expertise and connections, as they tend to invest in industries with which they are familiar.  
There is a need to formalise a network as these angles are known in their respective circles but 
the SMEs may not be aware of their existence.  No such formal network exists at present, 
although informal networks do exist and a new start-up may need to grope in the dark to locate 
them. It would be fruitful to initiate these networks as experience in US and Europe 
demonstrates. 
 
SMEs have working capital needs which careful planning of their business operations may fail 
to anticipate.  Mismatches in the timing of purchases and collections may occur leading to cash 
shortages that are usually short-term and urgent in nature.  The usual recourse for SMEs is to 
seek financing from banks but the approval of working capital loans may take some time.  It 
was the credit crunch that resulted from the Asian financial crisis that saw a number of SMEs 
failures in Singapore.  This prompted an expansion of the rules under the government’s Local 
Enterprise Financing Scheme.  
 
A proposal under SME 21 is to provide working capital to SME through a Working Capital 
Matching Service, functioning as a business-to-business capital-matching service to help SMEs 
in need of working capital to purchase raw materials for production or to fulfil a contract.  
Under the proposal a listing of companies interested in partnering SMEs with such working 
capital needs would be created.  In addition to financing, the partnership can also involve 
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supply of raw materials and joint involvement in a specified project.  SMEs that need working 
capital funds can approach the companies interested directly. 
 
The Local Enterprise Financing Scheme, which is administered by the Singapore Productivity 
and Standards Board, represents an attempt to address the problem of lack of access to finance. 
The scheme provides a fixed interest rate financing programme designed to encourage and 
assist local enterprises to upgrade, strengthen and expand their operations. It is offered through 
27 participating financial institutions and facilitates factory term loans, finance leases, 
machinery term loans, working capital loans, hire purchase loan, and factoring loans. The 
maximum limit on loans is $15 million.  
 
Access to Markets 
The lead agency responsible for trade is the Trade Development Board (TDB).  It was 
established in 1982 by an Act of Parliament as a full-fledged autonomous agency that could 
effectively represent and promote the country’s international trade interests and exports. Its 
formation was prompted by the perceived threat to the country’s trade at the start of the 1980s 
from global protectionist trends, changes in world trade patterns, and the weakening of 
Singapore’s markets under the stresses of global recession.  The main aspects of TDB’s work 
that have an impact on SMEs revolve around trade promotion, trade facilitation, business 
marketing, information on trade procedure, and information on foreign markets.  
 
To facilitate trade, the TDB showcases Singapore products and services through its on-line 
Singapore Products & Services Directory. This directory was created with the purpose of 
allowing collaborations between Singapore-based companies and overseas corporations. The 
directory allows companies to advertise their products and services, with the purpose of 
establishing contacts with buyers and/or sellers from around the world.  TDB also showcases 
Singapore companies through its annual awards and by posting details of the award winners on 
the TDB web page. To promote trade, SMEs are given tax incentives for participating in 
international trade fairs and exhibitions. The government at the same time encourages the 
development of credible regional trade fairs and forums in Singapore. The incentives under this 
programme include endorsement and marketing assistance through tax incentives and grants 
offered by TDB.  Singapore-based exhibition organisers are also encouraged to stage new trade 
shows in Singapore as well as to grow existing shows under the approved exhibition organiser. 
This is achieved through a concessionary tax rate of 10% on incremental income derived by 
approved exhibition organisers. The trade shows and exhibitions not only serve to export 
services but facilitate trade promotion and new business alliances. The Productivity and 
Standards Board and the Trade Development Board regularly lead groups of Singapore small 
and medium enterprises to seek out business opportunities in and beyond the region.  They 
have, for example, ventured to Canada, Chile, Germany and Australia. 
 
There are also specific government assistance schemes to develop SMEs export market 
potential through branding, franchise development, product design, packaging design, and the 
licensing of technology developed by local SMEs. The new initiative under SME 21 is the 
promotion of Singapore as a hub for SMEs to help the SMEs plug into the global network 
quickly. There is a German SME centre and a French SME centre in Singapore. A Nordic 
centre is being planned. The presence of foreign SMEs in Singapore will encourage the cross-
fertilization of best practices, expertise and ideas, and help local SMEs to upgrade themselves 
and find new markets. The aim is for Singapore SMEs to venture overseas through strategic 
alliances. 
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The Internet revolution presents both threats and opportunities to businesses. The government’s 
declared aim is to “dot.com” the entire country – transforming Singapore into 
“Singapore.com”, a competitive, vibrant knowledge-based economy. The key challenge is to 
find ways to help as many of the SMEs as possible to be part of this movement to dot.com 
Singapore with the view that they harness the Internet for e-commerce.  
 
 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
In the previous section we highlighted the main elements of the government’s strategy to 
provide what Tan, Tan and Young (2000) term the “entrepreneurial infrastructure” in 
Singapore. By entrepreneurial infrastructure, Tan, Tan and Young (2000) refer to the public 
and private sector elements intended to assist SMEs in the areas of assistance with tasks, 
resources, knowledge (training, development and education) and information. As Tan, Tan and 
Young (2000) point out, merely providing the infrastructure is insufficient. There are also the 
issues of communication, publicity, availability and perceptions. Access to the infrastructure 
requires awareness of the policy instruments ─ e.g., an SME may not use the patent search 
service unless the entrepreneur is aware of this service. The need for the service may only be 
invoked when there is awareness of the availability of a resource: the element of latent demand.  
 
The need to develop a more entrepreneurial culture as a prerequisite if the country is to reap 
the benefits offered by the New Economy has driven the government’s initiatives in this area. 
As part of its continuing drive to channel enterprises towards higher value-added activities, the 
government has recognised that SMEs are the logical vehicles for entrepreneurs to meet the 
challenge posed by the New Economy.  
 
It is by no means certain, however, that they are capable of taking up the challenge. The success 
of Singapore, one of the most remarkable economic success stories of the second half of the 
twentieth century, has been built on the creation of an environment conducive to attracting 
foreign direct investors and multinational corporations. As Dr Goh Keng Swee, who has been 
described as “Singapore’s early economic architect” (Ho and Hoon, 2000), noted in his Budget 
Statement to Parliament in 1970: 
 
We have made long and strenuous efforts to attract foreign investment into Singapore, but 
not because we need the money. The high level of our overseas assets shows that we have 
more than we can usefully spend in Singapore. We welcome foreign investors for the two 
things they bring with them ─ technology and markets. (Quoted in Ho and Hoon, 2000) 
 
The evolution of a highly professional and efficient civil service, to whose ranks have been 
drawn many of the brightest minds of the country, has supported these developments in vital 
ways. In turn, the top ranks of government-linked corporations have been filled by transfers 
from this elite corps of professionals. The result has been a virtual monopolisation by the 
government of the much of the cream of the country’s human capital. The multinational 
corporations, with their attractive employment conditions, absorb most of the remaining pool 
of talent (Lian, 2001).  
 
It may be conjectured that successful entrepreneurs in the New Economy are likely to be 
educated and technically literate and numerate as basic prerequisites, given the knowledge-
intensive nature of the IT industry. In addition, these people will need to possess Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial qualities, the class of innovators known as technopreneurs. Thus, as Lian 
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(2001) has argued, the very people likely to enjoy the attributes necessary for success as 
entrepreneurs in the New Economy have tended to be absorbed by the apparatus that has 
delivered success in the Old Economy. It therefore remains to be seen whether the efforts of 
the government in bringing about a drastic change in the mindset and economic culture built 
up painstakingly over three decades will succeed in channelling talent in the desired direction. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The role and development of SMEs in Singapore cannot be fully understood without referral 
to the pervasive influence of government in the country and the crucial role it plays in setting 
directions, marshalling resources, and coordinating the overall strategy of the different players 
in the economy. The goal of the knowledge-based economy holds great promise for the country, 
as indeed it does for other countries. What sets the country apart from most others is the scale 
of its government’s ambition and the thoroughness and single-mindedness with which it 
pursues it. At the same time, there is a certain efficiency in the approaches taken. The policy 
of identifying “promising local enterprises”, for example, may be regarded as an adaptation of 
the government’s favoured approach of picking winners, except that at the earlier stages of 
development the enterprises most likely to “win” are allowed to sort themselves out from the 
others before being singled out for special attention.  
 
Whilst the existing SMEs cope with change, new entrants in this state of disequilibrium will 
be what Schumpeter called “entrepreneurs” in his theory of economic development. These 
enterprises will be the ones for whom the new technopreneurship initiatives have been crafted.  
 
Official attention has turned in recent years to the need to develop a more entrepreneurial 
culture as a prerequisite if the country is to reap the benefits offered by the New Economy. The 
government has highlighted certain industries that it hopes to foster in the next ten years in the 
area of e-commerce and life sciences. SMEs are the logical entities to meet this challenge. The 
extent to which they are able to do so will critically shape the future of the country and may 
well determine its economic survival. 
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